As a means of recap, innovation often leads to political upheaval when nations neglect to adjust their vertical regulatory frameworks. The failure to revise legal norms creates a dissonance between the law and individual security. Multiple concerning conditions can surface to indicate strain on a nation’s social contract.[1] Individuals often seek outlets to express their dissatisfaction that their sense of self is under threat. Symptoms of this dissatisfaction can include nationalism, environmentalism, and immigration.[2] Although quite different, one may consider these symptoms as reactions to the stress that an inadequate social contract places on traditional identity’s sense of shared community.
Examples of such a societal stress responses can be seen in the Gilded Age, 1880-1918. Reacting to increasingly chaotic city planning and industrialization during the Gilded Age, early environmentalists rallied to set aside the first national park in the United States.[3] And federal immigration legislation such as the Chinese Exclusion Act, which banned Chinese immigration on the grounds of national security, and other immigration restrictions also emerged from social reformists during this period.[4] Similar examples of environmentalism and nationalism responses were also found across the globe, in examples like immigration increasing due to the Russian Revolution and national parks forming in Sweden and Switzerland in response to industrialization.[5]
As discord builds, the unrest within domestic vertical frameworks transmits to the international horizontal framework. The economic and political stability of the global economy becomes vulnerable to larger social disruptions. In essence, the global legal system can no longer fulfill its role to provide stability because nations have neglected individual security. As a result, the threat of larger social disruption builds into a pivotal point that forces nations to act and preserve their sovereignty.
The Gilded Age experienced such a pivot point in the global network in part because of the information and communication innovations between 1880-1918. During this period, advances in telecommunications and transportation dramatically impacted individual security.[6] Individuals across nations experienced – albeit unevenly – steam, coal powered and then combustible engines, electricity, telegraphs, global news agencies, and more.[7] The degree of connectivity increased worldwide.[8] Persons could travel the world multiple times in a lifetime at will.[9] This gave rise to increased migration among nations, impacting the customs, beliefs, and shared languages that create identity.[10] Additionally, the increase in trains, shipping, electrical, and telegraph grid systems increased concerns of environmental impact.
This transformation of the environment threatened the sense of residing in a common place of descent and communal history.[11] In addition to affecting employment, mental health and more, changes in telecommunication and transportation altered both traditional and global identity. Collectively, the technological advances threatened identity because they undermined basic individual security.[12] As a result, the vertical regulatory framework within nations became misaligned with its citizens for its value proposition to sufficiently protect the individual.
During the Gilded Age, the misalignment between vertical frameworks and individual security created the perception that control over selective privacy was no longer adequately protected. Individuals sensed that legal norms provided insufficient protections and began to react.[13] Budding nationalism and environmentalism within communities acted as symptoms, indicating a growing dissonance between legal norms and individual security.[14] For example, dense urban settings exposed problems with the safety and dependability of energy, water, and hygiene emerging from poor local ordinances and planning.[15] Concentrated industrialization created vulnerable working environments, both in working conditions and economic shocks upon plant closures.[16]
As the then-modern information and communication innovations of telegraphs, newspapers, and news agencies spread across the global system and economy, disconnections evolved into growing distrust among multiple nations.[17] Legal norms failed to provide the telecommunication, labor, antitrust, and national security laws necessary to instill a stable sense of place and community. Consequently, nationalism and environmentalism may have served as ‘canaries in the coalmine’ that vertical regulatory frameworks were failing to adequately protect an individual’s security in forming a traditional identity.[18] Then as now, deep within nations, the stress responses to a lack of acceptable and equitable legal norms were emerging.
It must be noted that a nation responds to a disconnect between its vertical regulatory framework and individual security with various degrees of speed based on its legal structure. For example, an authoritarian legal regime can adjust relatively quickly as compared to democratic structures, but it also experiences instability in enforcing the political acceptance of those changes. These differences in how nations adjust legal norms results in an uneven shift across the global economy. During a period of uneven global adjustment, individuals begin to seek vertical regulatory frameworks that provide adequate individual security.[19]
Among the options available during such global upheaval: demand that the social contract updates within one’s nation or migrate to a nation with a more ideal social contract. With the first option, traditional identity in the late 19th century was a strong anchor for demanding adequate protections within one’s own nation. The instinct was to remain in one’s community where shared customs and beliefs still existed. Citizens that remained began demanding a social contract that delivered on individual security. The resulting pressures within nations to provide such a social contract increased political instability between 1880 – 1918.[20] In part, individuals decided that the social contracts of their nations breached the obligation to adequately protect identity through its legal norms. Labor strikes, women’s suffragettism, rural populism, environmentalism, nationalism, and imperialism arose around the world.[21] Each of these movements intersected with identity insecurity because they touched upon valuing a core part of an individual’s sense of self: purpose in work, value in gender, respecting rural lifestyle, and recognizing shared heritage.[22]
Additionally, the second option of immigration also occurred. Migration exploded between 1880-1918 as individuals searched for a more ideal legal regime that provided access to the economic benefits of an increasingly global economy while protecting selective privacy within its borders.[23] Individuals sought protection from the perceived – and perhaps real – threats to individual security. When viewed through this lens of individual security, the immigration waves that arrived in America during this period are understandable. At enormous risk, individuals selected relocation and adoption of a new nationality as the best odds to the preservation of their identities built upon purpose in work, cultural values, and shared heritage. Essentially, immigration upticks may be viewed as individual determination that sufficient sense of self will be far better to sustain in the new nation than the threatened loss of self should one remain in their existing citizenship.
The migration upheaval of the Gilded Age offers a historical echo for today. Then and now, America offers a written, fixed Constitution and isolated national borders in comparison to protect individual identity as compared with European legal shuffling and power struggles.[24] For example, Then, European alliances were quickly shifting and building military forces in search of expanding trade and political power.[25] These shifts undermined the sense of stability inside nations and individuals made rational decisions to pursue a better social contract with legal norms that offered the stability to join or rebuild shared communities. Consequently, immigration to America soared during the Gilded Age period, often referred to as “the Great Wave.”[26] In a historical echo as the 21st century began, the United States’ capacities to absorb immigrants struggles under a modern immigration surge with almost one quarter of the current resident American population classified within the immigrant community.[27] And as of this writing, Europe strains under the effects of Brexit and the Russian/Ukraine War.[28]
Additionally, from 1880-1918, the horizontal framework strained to sustain international relations.[29] The uneven and disconnected adjustments to vertical frameworks within nations also led to increased friction between nations. One acronym assigned to international relations during this period is ‘international anarchy’ because economic competition between nations became so prevalent.[30] Calls to prevent larger social disruptions were often ignored or minimized.[31] Back then, the horizontal regulatory system lacked sufficient legal norms to address to the growing impact that telecommunication and transportation changes were inflicting upon individual security.[32] As upheaval reached a critical inflection point, the pressure within nations, seen in symptoms such as nationalism and environmentalism, and between nations, seen in military build ups, grew into hostilities and erupted into a world war.[33] As of this writing, the outbreak of war between Russia and Ukraine hints at just how akin tension in international relations is today at the challenges of cybersecurity and digital warfare.
[1] See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump 171-73 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2002).
[2] See Frank J. Garcia, Convergences: A Prospectus for Justice in a Global Market Society, 10 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 128, 129-30 (2016).
[3] See Rebecca Edwards, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Vol. 8, No. 4, 463, 468
(Oct. 2009).
[4] See Rebecca Edwards, The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, Vol. 8, No. 4, 465-66
(Oct. 2009).
[5] See https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/immigration-emigration-and-empire-population-politics-imperial-and-revolutionary-russia (last visited Apr. 13, 2026); https://www.britannica.com/topic/environmentalism/History-of-the-environmental-movement (last visited Apr. 14, 2026).
[6] See George Constable and Bob Somerville, A Century of Innovation: Twenty Engineering Achievements that Transformed Our Lives (Joseph Henry Press, 2003) (noting Electrification was called “the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th Century”).
[7] See George Constable and Bob Somerville, A Century of Innovation: Twenty Engineering Achievements that Transformed Our Lives (Joseph Henry Press, 2003) (noting Electrification was called “the greatest engineering achievement of the 20th Century”).
[8] Although connectivity innovations in the Gilded Age period are far surpassed by today’s instant Internet capabilities, the concerns are the disruptions such innovations place upon the social contract. In magnitude, time will tell which period strained the vertical and horizontal legal systems more.
[9] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 11-12, 15 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[10] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011); Dirk Messner, World Society – Structures and Trends, 29 (Paul M Kennedy et al., Global Trends and Global Governance (Pluto Press) (2002)); Frank J. Garcia, Convergences: A Prospectus for Justice in a Global Market Society, 10 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 128, 140 (2016).
[11] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump 178, 348 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2002).
[12] See Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maslow’s_hierarchy_of_needs (last visited Apr. 14, 2026).
[13] See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump 334 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2002).
[14]See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump 150-51, 390-91 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2002); Frank J. Garcia, Convergences: A Prospectus for Justice in a Global Market Society, 10 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 128, 129-30 (2016).
[15] See Alexandra W. Lough, The Politics of Urban Reform in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1870–1920, 8, 9-11, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. 2016).
[16] See Alexandra W. Lough, The Politics of Urban Reform in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, 1870–1920, 8, 9-11, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan. 2016).
[17] See Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914, 449, 457, 462-64, The American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Apr. 1924).
[18] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[19]See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Globalization and its Discontents Revisited: Anti-Globalization in the Era of Trump 150-51, 171-73, 178, 348 (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2nd ed. 2002); Frank J. Garcia, Convergences: A Prospectus for Justice in a Global Market Society, 10 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 128, 129-30 (2016).
[20] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[21] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[22] Echoes of similar concerns have arisen today in response to AI implementation, transgender identification, and colonization.
[23] See Marie McAuliffe and Binod Khadria, World Migration Report 2020 7-8 (2020).
[24] See Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914, 449, 450-53, The American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Apr. 1924).
[25] See Bernadotte E. Schmitt, Triple Alliance and Triple Entente, 1902-1914, 466-67, The American Historical Review, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Apr. 1924).
[26] See Library of Congress, U.S. History Primary Source Timeline, Immigration to the United States, 1851-1900 https://www.loc.gov/classroom-materials/united-states-history-primary-source-timeline/rise-of-industrial-america-1876-1900/immigration-to-united-states-1851-1900/( Last Visited Apr. 13, 2026); Center for Immigration Studies, Historical Overview of Immigration Policy, https://cis.org/Historical-Overview-Immigration-Policy(Last Visited Apr. 13, 2026); See Also Bill of Rights Institute, Handout B: Immigration in the Gilded Age and Progressive Era, https://billofrightsinstitute.org/activities/handout-b-immigration-in-the-gilded-age-and-progressive-era/( Last Visited Apr. 13, 2026).
[27] See Charles Hirschman, Immigration to the United States: Recent Trends and Future Prospects. Malays J Econ Studies. 2014;51(1):69-85. PMID: 25620887; PMCID: PMC4302270., https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC4302270/ (Last Visited Apr. 13, 2026); Center for Immigration Studies, The cultural consequences of record immigration, https://cis.org/Oped/cultural-consequences-record-immigration (Last Visited Apr. 14, 2026).
[28] See Phuong Thi Thu Vu, Nhan Huynh, Hoa Phan, Hanh Hoang, Financial earthquakes and aftershocks: From Brexit to Russia-Ukraine conflict and the stability of European banks, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Vol. 88, 2023, 101830, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1042443123000987 (Last Visited Apr. 5, 2026).
[29] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[30] See International anarchy Robert L. Bloom, et al., International Anarchy (1900-1918). Pt. XVIII: The Western World in the Twentieth Century: The Historical Setting, Ideas and Institutions of Western Man, 1-4 (Gettysburg College, 1958).
[31] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
[32] See International Financial Organization, Bretton Woods Documents – Riddle Comments on Bretton Woods Proposals – Comments, 1849648, WB IBRD/IDA STAFF-09-02, World Bank Group Archives, Washington, D.C., United States.
[33] See Rabindranath Tagore, The Essential Tagore, 170-182 (Fakrul Alan, et al. eds. 2011).
